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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
KARL L. ROESCH, as to an undivided
77.5% interest, and RIVER TERRACE
ESTATES, INC., as to an undivided
22.5% interest,

)
)
)
)

)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

DOCKET NO. 39836-2012
Kootenai County Case
No. CV-2011-3947

)

)
v.
DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried
man; CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC.;
and SHEA REALTORS, PLLC,

)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

)
Defendants.

)
)
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai
THE HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
John A. Finney
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
120 East Lake Street, Ste 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a judicial foreclosure case.

RIVER TERRACE ESTATES, INC.

KARL L. ROESCH and

(herein "Secured Parties") commenced

this action to foreclose upon a Promissory Note secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage granted by the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN upon
real property in Kootenai County, Idaho.

The Plaintiffs obtained

a foreclosure decree entitled Judgment And Decree Of Sale entered
August 30, 2011.

The Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge,

presiding, entered an Amended Judgment and Decree Of Foreclosure,
on March 20, 2012, from which the Secured Parties appeal.

II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On or about May 16, 2011, KARL L. ROESCH and RIVER TERRACE

ESTATES, INC.

(herein "Secured Parties") commenced this judicial

foreclosure action to foreclose upon a Promissory Note secured by
a Real Estate Mortgage granted by the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN
upon real property in Kootenai County, Idaho.

The action named

as defendants DANIEL L. KLEMANN, the maker of the Promissory Note
and mortgagor of the Real Estate Mortgage, and the holders of
junior or inferior mortgages upon the real property, CORNERSTONE
FINANCIAL, INC. and SHEA REALTORS, PLLC.
The Complaint filed May 16, 2011 set forth the unpaid
principal balance of the indebtedness, the interest paid to date,
and the note rate of interest accruing.
paragraph 11.

R. Pgs. 1-8, Complaint

The Complaint then set forth the relief requested

for judicial foreclosure: An adjudication of the unpaid principal
balance, the principal balance date, the interest rate accruing
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through the judicial foreclosure sale, the costs and attorney
fees of foreclosure, priority adjudication, the sale of the
property, and a deficiency judgment if the debt is not satisfied.
R. Pgs. 1-8, Complaint paragraphs 15, 19-24.
Following service of process the Defendant SHEA REALTORS,
PLLC stipulated to a priority adjudication, the Defendant
CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC. stipulated to a priority
adjudication, and the Defendant KLEMANN was defaulted.

On August

30, 2011, the Judgment And Decree Of Sale was entered, which
provided for a determination of the amounts due and accruing, the
priority date and priority adjudication, for the judicial sale of
the property pledged as security, and for proceedings to
adjudicate a deficiency money judgment, if any.

R. Pgs 11-15.

A

Writ of Execution For Sale Of Real Property was issued on
September 13, 2011 by the District Court which was consistent
with the pleadings

the Complaint and the provisions of the

Judgment And Decree Of Sale.

R. Pgs 16-18.

After encountering difficulties with the Kootenai County
Sheriff in executing pursuant to the decree and the writ, the
Secured Parties filed a Petition For Writ Of Mandamus To Compel
Sheriff on December 14, 2011.

R. Pgs 19-29.

On January 31,

2012, the Secured Parties and the Kootenai County Sheriff and the
Kootenai County Civil Deputy Prosecuting Attorney were able to
resolve the issue of executing pursuant to the decree and the
writ (based upon similar proceedings to compel before a different
District Court Judge for Kootenai County) and the Secured Parties
withdrew the petition to compel.
The District Court on January 31, 2011, rather than accept
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the withdrawal of the petition, proceeded as to the "correct"
rate of interest accruing between the adjudication to sell the
property and the actual sale of the property.
22.

Transcript Pgs. 1-

The District Court then entered on March 14, 2011 what i t

entitled Memorandum Decision And Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion
For A Writ Of Mandamus. R. Pgs. 35-60 (the petition had been
withdrawn).

The District Court then entered the Amended Judgment

And Decree Of Sale on March 20, 2012.

R. Pgs 61-65.

The Secured Parties timely filed a Notice of Appeal as to
the Amended Judgment And Decree Of Sale.

R. Pgs. 66-69.

This

appeal follows.

III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 30, 2011, the District Court entered a Judgment And
Decree of Sale which determined the amount due and owing on a
promissory note secured by real property as of a date certain plus
interest still accruing on the note rate through the date of
foreclosure sale.
15%.

The interest accruing was at the note rate of

The Judgment And Decree of Sale further ordered that the

foreclosure sale proceeds be applied to the note indebtedness.
A Writ of Execution For Sale Of Real Property was issued
September 13, 2011 which conformed to the decree.
On March 20, 2012, the District Court entered an Amended
Judgment And Decree Of Sale which amended the interest accruing
between the date certain through the date of foreclosure sale.
The note rate accrued on the unpaid principal balance.

The

interest rate used was the "statutory judgment" rate of 5.250%
pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) and was applied to the
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total amount due (principal, interest, and attorney fees and
costs) .
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Appellant's statement of the issue on appeal is: Did the
District Court err in setting of the rate of interest in a
foreclosure action accruing between the order of sale and the
actual sheriff's sale date to be held?
Alternatively the issue on appeal can be stated as: Does the
note rate of interest accruing on a debt secured by real property
continue through the date of the judicial sheriff's foreclosure
sale of the property and the application of the proceeds of the
sale to the debt?
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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
I.

THE NOTE RATE OF INTEREST CONTINUES TO ACCRUE THROUGH THE
DATE OF THE JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALE
The issue on appeal in this case is the District Court's

reduction of the rate of interest from the "note" rate to the
"statutory judgment" rate from the entry of the order for sale
until the actual foreclosure sale by the sheriff and the
application of the proceeds of sale to the debt.

The foreclosure

process upon real property securing a debt, whether judicially or
by power of sale, is well established.

Generally, the secured

party must first seek to recover by the sale of the security.

The

amount recovered at the sale or the fair market value, whichever
is greater, is applied to the debt.

The debt includes the

principal and note rate of interest through the date of sale.
Redemption periods apply to the foreclosed property.

Redemption

periods for non-judicial sales are prior to the sale held.
Redemption periods for judicial sales are after the sale held.

If

the amount recovered from the foreclosure sale of the property
does not satisfy the debt, a deficiency can be recovered as a
personal money judgment.
In the instant action, the Secured Parties held a note
secured by a mortgage.

Regarding the foreclosure of mortgage,

Idaho Code § 6-101(1) provides in relevant part (emphasis added)
as follows:
There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt, or
the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real
estate which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter. In such action the court may, ~
its judgment, direct a sale of the incumbered property (or
so much thereof as may be necessary) and the application of
the proceeds of the sale to the payment of the costs of the
court and the expenses of the sale, and the amount due to
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 6

the plaintiff; and sales of real estate under judgments of
foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to redemption
as in the case of sales under execution; (and if i t appear
from the sheriff's return that the proceeds are
insufficient, and a balance still remains due, judgment can
then be docketed for such balance against the defendant or
defendants personally liable for the debt), and i t becomes a
lien on the real estate of such judgment debtor, as in other
cases on which execution may be issued.
The District Court failed to recognize that in a foreclosure,
the Court adjudicates ("by its judgment") the indebtedness and
orders a sale of the security from which to apply the sale
proceeds to the indebtedness ("the amount due the plaintiff") .
The indebtedness accrues interest pursuant to the debt instrument
through sale.

That is the "amount due the plaintiff" pursuant to

Idaho Code § 6-101(1).

The Court's order to sell does not covert

the indebtedness to a final money judgment upon which the
statutory judgment interest rate accrues.
Following the foreclosure sale, if a deficiency exists, the
Court then holds supplemental proceedings by which to adjudicate
the deficiency money judgment.

It is not until the deficiency is

adjudicated and entered that the statutory "judgment interest"
rate would apply.

Idaho Code § 6-108 provides regarding

deficiency judgments on a mortgage (emphasis added), as follows:
No court in the state of Idaho shall have jurisdiction to
enter a deficiency judgment in any case involving a
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in any amount
greater than the difference between the mortgage
indebtedness, as determined by the decree, plus costs of
foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable value of the
mortgaged property, to be determined by the court in the
decree upon the taking of evidence of such value.
A foreclosure action on a mortgage involves not suing on a
debt, but rather first collecting on the security.

In the first

appeal of Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Parsons, 116 Idaho 545,
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549-50,

(Ct. App. 1989), the Court recognized the nature of a

mortgage and foreclosure process, and stated as follows:
First, the law in Idaho authorizes a single form of action
to collect a debt secured by a mortgage. I.C. § 6-101. To
collect on the debt, the mortgage must be foreclosed. The
creditor may not simply sue on the debt and collect by
execution on the judgment. Quintana v. Anthony, 109 Idaho
977, 979-80, 712 P.2d 678, 680-81 (Ct.App.1985). The bank
correctly sought repayment of its $32,000 loan by the
mortgage foreclosure.
Second, Idaho law provides that "a mortgage is a lien upon
everything that would pass by a grant or conveyance of the
property." I.C. § 45-906. The bank produced evidence that
its mortgage was properly recorded. Additionally, when the
bank filed the complaint in foreclosure, it also filed a Lis
Pendens under I.C. § 6-504, which gave notice to any
subsequent purchaser that the foreclosure action was
pending. See Suitts v. First Security Bank o£ Idaho, N.A.,
100 Idaho 555, 559, 602 P.2d 53, 57 (1979). The record does
not indicate that any party with a properly recorded
interest prior to the mortgage has contested this
foreclosure.
In the second appeal of Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v.
Parsons, 118 Idaho 324, 326-27,

(Ct. App. 1990), the Court again

recited the difference in the action and held that:
Appellants cite Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 382 P.2d
913 (1963), as authority that no lien existed upon the
property subject to execution because the judgment was not
recorded. However, we do not believe that Messenger is on
point. It did not involve a foreclosure action and therefore
has no application to the instant case.
As noted, this case arises from a mortgage foreclosure
action. A mortgage is a lien upon everything that would pass
by grant or conveyance of the property. I.C. § 45-906.
Pursuant to I.C. § 6-101, et seq., a mortgagee must first
seek payment of a mortgage debt from the mortgaged property.
Only if there is a deficiency, will the mortgagee be allowed
to pursue the other assets of the mortgage debtor. If a
deficiency judgment is obtained in due course by the
mortgagee pursuant to I.C. § 6-108, that deficiency judgment
would be subject to the recording provisions of I.C. § 101110. In this way, the Idaho law protects property not
subject to the mortgage unless the value of the mortgaged
property is exhausted. Since the lien against the property
existed by virtue of the recording of the mortgage, we hold
that recording the "Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and
Order of Sale" with the county recorder was not required in
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order to proceed with the sheriff's sale, or issuance of the
sheriff's certificate of sale and ultimately the sheriff's
deed on foreclosure.
The process of retaining jurisdiction to determine the fair
market value for the purposes of a deficiency per I.C. § 6-108
was set forth in First Nat. Bank of N. Idaho, N.A. v. Burgess,
118 Idaho 627, 631,

(Ct. App. 1990), as follows:

The statute "requires determination of the fair market value
of the mortgage property before a deficiency judgment can be
awarded,"
Eastern
Idaho
Production
Credit
Assoc.
v.
Placerton, Inc., 100 Idaho 863, 870, 606 P.2d 967, 974
(1980), and has been construed to require that the valuation
should be that as it existed at the time of the entry of the
original decree. Id., at 871, n. 4, 606 P.2d at 975, n. 4.
However, nothing in the statute forbids the procedure
utilized in this case by the district court. By retaining
jurisdiction, the court reserved the right to take evidence
on valuation at a later date and, if necessary, to amend the
decree of foreclosure to include a determination of value,
established as of the date of the original de'cree. Nothing
about this procedure would appear to violate Burgess's right
under the statute. Accordingly, we reject his contention
that the district court erred in retaining jurisdiction to
make a subsequent determination of value.
The adjudication of indebtedness and the order of sale are not the
final judgment in the matter.

The District Court retains

jurisdiction to determine value and deficiency.
In regards to the foreclosure of a deed of trust, Idaho Code
§ 45-1503 provides in relevant part

(emphasis added) as follows:

Where any transfer in trust of any estate in real property
is hereafter made to secure the performance of such an
obligation, a power of sale is hereby conferred upon the
trustee to be exercised after a breach of the obligation for
which such transfer is security, and a deed of trust
executed in conformity with this act may be foreclosed by
advertisement and sale in the manner hereinafter provided,
or, at the option of beneficiary, by foreclosure as provided
by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property.
In the event a Deed of Trust is judicially foreclosed upon, it is
done so as a mortgage, with the application of Title 6, Chapter 1
of the Idaho Code.
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Similarly, for a deed of trust foreclosed non-judicially,
Idaho Code § 45-1512, regarding a money judgment by an action
seeking a balance after a trustee' sale, provides (emphasis added)
as follows:
At any time within 3 months after any sale under a deed of
trust, as hereinbefore provided, a money judgment may be
sought for the balance due upon the obligation for which
such deed of trust was given as security, and in such action
the plaintiff shall set forth in his complaint the entire
amount of indebtedness which was secured by such deed of
trust and the amount for which the same was sold and the
fair market value at the date of sale, together with
interest from such date of sale, costs of sale and
attorney's fees. Before rendering judgment the court shall
find the fair market value of the real property sold at the
time of sale. The court may not render judgment for more
than the amount by which the entire amount of indebtedness
due at the time of sale exceeds the fair market value at
that time, with interest from date of sale, but in no event
may the judgment exceed the difference between the amount
for which such property was sold and the entire amount of
the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust.
In Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177 (Ct App. 1984), the
Court ruled that in a judicial foreclosure proceeding on a deed
of trust, the trial court uses the judicial mortgage foreclosure
proceedings (I.C. § 6-101 and 6-108) in the determination of the
deficiency judgment.

That includes the application of the manner

of determining the total amount of the indebtedness and the
application of the sales proceeds or fair market value, to
determine the deficiency due on the indebtedness, which becomes a
personal money judgment.

The case and analysis spoke in terms of

applying the rate of interest on money due to payments made by a
junior lienholder on a senior lien.

The Court in Thompson ruled

that:
The decree of foreclosure provides the cut off date for
fixing the amount of the mortgage indebtedness. "The decree
directing a sale of the premises should find the exact
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 10

amount due on the mortgage and not leave this to be
calculated by the office." FN2 L. JONES, LAW OF MORTGAGES OF
REAL PROPERTY § 2042 at 493 (8~ ed. 1928)
FN2. This, of course, does not preclude the decree from
setting forth a per diem amount of interest which will
accrue from the date of the decree to the date of sale.
Also, it does not preclude adding costs of the
foreclosure sale in computing the amount of any
deficiency judgment.
Thompson, 106 Idaho at 182-3.

Nothing in that provision provides

that the rate of interest between the decree directing a sale and
the sale date is at the statutory judgment rate.

At the time of

Thompson, the statutory rate on money due but unpaid and the
statutory judgment rate were both 8%.

The Thompson case dealt

with several issues, including the applicable rate of interest to
accrue on the payments advanced on a senior lien (which was the
8% "statutory" rate on money due).

Having the same rate can

cause confusion, but the District Court misunderstood the ruling.
As the Thompson Court state, the interest "continues" to accrue
until the deficiency judgment is entered, then the unpaid
principal and the unpaid interest, etc. are all totaled for a
person money judgment, which that total then accrues interest at
the statutory judgment rate of interest.
The Court that same year in Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878,
886 (Ct. App. 1984) further highlighted and identified the
distinction between money due prior to the adjudication of a
final money judgment and the rate of interest on money due (but
prior to adjudication), citing as follows:

See also Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177, 677 P.2d 490
(Ct.App.1984) (applying nonjudgment legal rate to
obligations owed but not yet adjudicated, and judgment rate
to such obligations after adjudication) .
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In a foreclosure, the note rate (when set forth) or the
"nonjudgment" legal rate (when there is no rate by the note) is
applied through the foreclosure process.

The "judgment" rate

applies after adjudication of the deficiency (and atleast through
the date of the foreclosure sale) .
As set forth in Perkins v. Bundy, 42 Idaho 560, 561 (1926),
"[a] decree of foreclosure of a mortgage is in no sense a
personal judgment, and no personal judgment can be entered until
after the foreclosure sale."

This is because an adjudication of

the amount due on an instrument of indebtedness for foreclosure
is not a "judgment" upon which "judgment interest" then accrues.
The adjudication of the amount due is necessary to hold the
foreclosure sale.

The deficiency, if any, is the personal

judgment (upon which the statutory judgment interest rate then
accrues) .
In Isaak v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 907, 910
(1991), the Court held that "[t]he correct date for determining
the value of the [property sold at foreclosure sale] would have
been the date when the trial court in a foreclosure case
determined whether a deficiency judgment should be entered
pursuant to I.C. § 6-108."

The Court went on to describe the

method for determining the deficiency, which includes interest
before the sale date at the rate in the instrument of
indebtedness.
When the Court has considered the deficiency judgment
proceedings pursuant to the deed of trust non-judicial process,
(rather than the mortgage foreclosure statutes), the same result
is found.

In Wilhelm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 151
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(2001) (citing Farber v. Howell, 111 Idaho 132, 135 (1986»

the

Court of Appeals explained the deficiency process and how the
deficiency is calculated on a non-judicial foreclosure.

The first

step is to continue the interest on the debt at the note rate
through the date of foreclosure sale.

Then the sales proceeds or

fair market value (whichever is greater) is applied.

See also

First National Bank of North Idaho v. Burgess, 118 Idaho 627
(1990) cited above and American Mutual Building & Loan v. Kesler,
64 Idaho 799 (1943) for general descriptions of the foreclosure
process, including the deficiency and interest calculations.
The District Court failed to recognize the applicable
interest rate in a foreclosure action.

Interest at the note rate

continues to accrue on the unpaid principal balance through the
foreclosure sale date.

The District Court held that principal,

interest, and attorney fees were totaled and that statutory
judgment rate of interest applied to that total through the
foreclosure sale date.

The application of the statutory judgment

rate arises in a foreclosure action only after the foreclosure
sale and supplemental proceedings.

In a foreclosure, a final

personal money judgment (upon which the statutory judgment rate of
interest would then accrue) is not entered until, if at all,
deficiency proceedings are held after the foreclosure sale and
application of the sale proceeds (or the fair market value,
whichever is greater) to the debt.

Those post sale proceedings

and the calculation of any remaining unpaid debt continues at the
note rate of interest.

Not until the deficiency personal money

judgment is entered does the statutory rate of interest then
accrue.

The final "judgment" is not the decree of sale, but
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rather is the personal judgment based on deficiency, if needed.
Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) which provides for the postjudgment statutory rate of interest on a personal money judgment
is inapplicable to the foreclosure proceeding before the judicial
foreclosure sale is held.

Foreclosure sales are not the same

thing as a real property execution sale seeking to recover on a
lien which arises from a money judgment (whether based upon
contract, tort, foreclosure deficiency judgment, or otherwise) .
The District Court relies upon several cases and the District
Court's prior decision in an unrelated group of foreclosure
proceedings involving a separate common debtor.

The prior

decision by the District Court in the unrelated cases was not
subjected to review upon appeal, based upon a bankruptcy discharge
preventing a deficiency and a debt that greatly exceed value.
The District Court primarily relies upon Bouten Const. Co. v.
H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756 (1999) for its decision as to
interest.

That case dealt with a breach of construction contract

(not a judicial foreclosure of a note secured by a mortgage).

The

language relied upon by the District Court dealt with prejudgment,
interjudgment, and post judgment interest for damages awarded as
increased construction costs.

The crux of the ruling was that the

judgment rate of interest in effect at the entry of the judgment
remains unchanged until the judgment is paid.

The rate does not

fluctuate each year with the changes to rate.

The Bouten case has

nothing to do with the issue in the instant matter.

The Bouten

case does not involve any rate of interest applicable in a
mortgage foreclosure whatsoever.
flawed.
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The District Court's analysis is

II.

THE SHERIFF IS REQUIRED TO HOLD THE FORECLOSURE SALE
The duties and responsibility of the Sheriff's Department in

proceeding on a foreclosure sale of real property is not
discretionary.

By the decree and the writ, the Sheriff's

Department is ordered and required to "conduct a Sheriff's
Foreclosure Sale for the sums due to the Plaintiff."

The

Plaintiff has a clear legal right to have the act performed;
specifically the conduct of the sale with an application of the
proceeds to the amount due on the indebtedness.

In addition, the

Sheriff's Department has a clear duty to act, and the action is
ministerial in nature.

There is no exercise of discretion

necessary for the Sheriff's Department.
As set forth in Blumauer-Frank Drug Co. v. Branstetter, 4
Idaho 557 (1895), there is no discretion for the Sheriff's
Department:
We must not lose sight of the fact that process faire upon
its face must be executed by the sheriff, upon its being
placed in his hands. We hold the affidavit and notice to be
process. No objection is made by the respondent from the
form of the process. Therefore, the sheriff must execute it.
The sheriff cannot be called upon, when he receives and
execution, to sit in judgment upon the validity of the
judgment. Neither can he, in this case, be called upon to
sit in judgment on the validity of the mortgage. This is for
the court, and not for the sheriff.
In addition, the Sheriff's Department is liable for the failure to
act.

See generally Price v. Pace, 50 Idaho 353 (1931); Works v.

Byrom, 22 Idaho 794 (1912).
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CONCLUSION
The Secured Parties are entitled to a decree of sale which
adjudicates the amount due on the mortgage and provides for
interest at the note rate through the date of sale (as well as
attorney fees and costs of foreclosure and the sheriff's costs of
sale).

If the proceeds of sale do not satisfy the indebtedness,

the District Court through supplemental proceedings shall then
determine the fair market value and apply the greater of the fair
market value or the proceeds of sale to the indebtedness to
adjudicate the deficiency judgment.

The deficiency judgment shall

accrue interest at the statutory judgment rate.

The Amended

Judgment And Decree Of Sale entered by the District Court should
be stricken, and the matter proceed to sale on the Judgment And
Decree Of Sale previously entered in this matter.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~

~day

of July, 2012.

t-7~·:±~
==
J"oHN A. FINNEY
V
tINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this l.fJ fr'- day of July, 2012, two
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, were served by
deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were addressed to:
NONE
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